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STATEMENT OF TEE CASE 
I. NATURE OF TI33 CASE 
This litigation was filed by Indian Springs, LLC (hereinafter "Indian Springs") to coIlect 
upon a defaulted promissory note and to foreclosure upon a corresponding mortgage. The fact 
that the promissory note and mortgage were in default was not disputed. Rather, two other 
primary disputes arose in this case. The first concerned the amount owing under the defaulted 
pro~nissory note and mortgage. The second concerned the identity of the owner of the real 
property, which was only relevant as to who would retain redemption rights following the 
foreclosure sale. 
Indian Springs contended that the property was owned by AICO Recreational Properties, 
LLC (hereinafter "AICO") which had in its bankruptcy abandoned all interest ul the real 
property, i~~cluding any redemption rights. The Appellants do not dispute that the deeds to the 
real property were transfened to AICO; however, they contend that they should have instead 
been transfened to Recreatioi~al Properties A&B, a partnership. As such, they argue that 
Recreational Properties A&B, a partnerslcp, should be entitled to redemption rights. 
Following s m a r y  judgment proceedings, the district court determined the amoru~t due 
and owing on the pronlissory note and mortgage and concluded that Recreational Properiies 
A&B, a partnership, had no interest in the mortgaged property. The district court thereupon 
entered its Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure, and Order of Sale. The Appellants subsequently 
filed numerous pro se motions for reconsideration, which were denied by the district court. This 
appeal followed.' 
TI. STATEMENT OF TEE FACTS 
A. Purchase asad Sale Documents 
The real property which is the subject of this appeal consists of natural hot springs and 
related improvenlents and is locally known as the Indian Springs Natatoriun~ (hereinafter "the 
Real ~ r o p e r t ~ " ) . ~  The Real Property was the subject of a purchase and sale that is documented in 
the following described documents wlGch were all executed on July 2, 1996. 
A Sales Agreement was executed by D.M. Thornhill, Shirley Thornhill and Indian 
Springs Natatorium Inc. (collectively "Sellers"), agreeing to sell the Red Property to "Terry W. 
Andersen and Rosanna Andersen, Husband and Wife, and John K. Baker and Julie Baker, 
Husband and Wife, DBA Recreational Properties A&B" (collectively "Buyers") for the sum of 
: The appellate record in this case consists of the original Clerk's Record (hereinafler " R )  
lodged on December 6,2007, with four additional supplements. The first supplenlent (hereinafter 
"ISR") was lodged directly by the district court clerk as the Supplemental Clerk's Record on 
June 17,2008. The second supple~nent (hereinafter "2SR") was the product of a motion filed by 
the Appellants and granted by the Supreme Court ul its Order re: Augmentation of the Clerk's 
Record dated June 9,2008. The third suppleinent (hereinafter "3SR) was the product of a 
second motion filed by the Appellants and granted by the Supreme Court in its Order Granting 
Motion to Include Exhibits dated July 2,2008. The fourth supplement (hereumfter "4SR) was 
the product of a nlotion filed by the Respondent and granted by the Supreme Court in its Order 
Granting Motioil to Augment Clerk's Record dated July 16, 2008. This brief will cite documents 
by reference to the applicable record or supplement in which the document is found and by page 
number. Because the docu~lents contained in 2SR, 3SR and 4SR are not nunbered 
consecutively or are not numbered at all, any documents cited in those supplenlents will be 
numbered consecutively froin the fxst page. Tl~e name of the referenced document may also 
appear following the citation. 
"SR. 7 (Minute Entry and Order). 
$750,000.~ A down payment of $100,000 was made with the remaining balance to be paid over 
time.4 
A Pro~~ussory Note in favor of the Sellers was executed by Terry W. Andersen and John 
K. Baker for and on behalf of "RFKXEATIONAL PROPERTIES A & B, A PARTIERSHIP.'" 
The Pronussow Note was further guaranteed by "TERRY ANDERSEN, Trustee of the Terry W. 
Andersen and Rosanna Andersen Living Revocable Trust dated February 1, 1991."~ The 
Promissory Note stated that it was "secured by a Mortgage of even date."7 
Warranty Deeds were executed by the Sellers transferring ownership of the Real Property 
to "TERRY W. ANDERSEN, Trustee of Andersen Living Trust and JOHN K. BAKER and 
jUlLIE BAKER Husband and ~ i f e . " ~  
A Real Estate Mortgage was executed as f i e r  security by "TERRY W. ANDERSEN, 
Trustee of Andersen Living Trust, and JOHN K. BAKER and JULIE BAKER, husband and 
wife.-'g 
B. Buyers transfer their Interest to AICO 
By Warranty Deed executed September 18, 1997, John K. Baker and Julie A. Baker 
transferred their interest in the Real Property to AICO." By Quitclaim Deed executed February 
' 4SR. 233-41 (Exhibit A to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
Id. 
' 4SR. 247-50 (Exhibit D to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
Id. 
' I d .  
4SR. 242-46 (Exhibits B & C to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
4SR. 251 -54 (Exhibit E to Affidavit of Tom Henesli). 
24, 1998, "Teny W. Andersen, Trustee" also transferred the Trust's interest in the Real Property 
to AIco." This documentation indisputably shows that as of February 24. 1998, AICO was the 
sole owner of the Real Property. There is no evidence to suggest that AICO later transferred its 
interest in the Real Property. 
Subsequently. AICO filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was converted to a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.'2 By order of the Bank~~ptcy Court dated May 14, 2004, the bankruptcy 
estate abandoned all interest in the Real property. l3 
C. The hdersen Living Trnst continued to cIaim an interest in Real Proper@ 
after transferring its interest to AICO 
On August 21,2003, a document entitled "Notice of Interest" was recorded in the Power 
County Recorder's Office by Rosanna Andersen in which "Terry W. Andersen, Trustee, on 
behalf of the Andersen Living Trustt made a claim of ?4 interest in the Real ~ r o ~ e r t y . ' ~  The 
.'Notice of Interest" further claimed that the Andersen Living Trust had at no time transferred its 
interest to a third party.'5 However, that claim directly contradicts the Quitclaim Deed 
mentioned above, which was executed February 24, 1998, and recorded February 24, 1998.j6 
lo  4SR. 255-58 (Exhibit F to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
" 4SR. 259-62 (Exhibit G to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
l2  4SR. 330-35 (Exhibit T to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
l3  Id. 
l4  4SR. 298-305 (Exhibit M to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
'j Id. 
l 6  4SR. 259-62 (Exhibit G to Affidavit of Tom Henes11). 
D. Recreational Pmperties A&B files a "Notice of Interest9 in the Real Property 
On August 21, 2003, a document entitled 'Wotice of Interest" was recorded in the Power 
County Recorder's Office by Rosanna Andersen in which "Terry W. Andersen, mana,&g 
partner, on behalf of the Partnerslcp, Recreational Properties A and B claimed an interest in the 
Real Property.17 This '.Notice of Interest" asserted that this claim was based upon a belief that 
the Real Estate Mortgage dated oil July 2, 1996, was executed "by a partnership, Recreational 
Properties A & B, signed by Teny Andersen as T ~ s t e e  for the Aldersen Living Trust and John 
K. Baker and Julie A. Baker, husband and wife."" However, the Real Estate Mortgage dated 
July 2, 1996, does not contain any reference Recreational Properties A & B, a partnersl~p.19 
E. Buyers defaulted om the Promissory Note anad Mortgage 
The Buyers failed to pay the requisite installment payment due December 1,2000, under 
the Promissory ~ o t e . ~ '  A payment was later received December 19, 2000, and ii~stallment 
payments continued through March 2003.~' After that date, only three other instalbent 
payments were received on July 6, 2004, August 17, 2004, and August 10 ,2005 .~  As a result of 
the iicssed payments, the Prolnissory Note and Mortgage were declared in default on February 
24, 2005, and all sun~s due and owing there under were declared i~xmediately payable.23 
" 4SR. 284-91 (Exlubit L to Affidavit of Ton1 Hei~esh). 
I S  id. 
l 9  4SR. 251-54 (Exhibit E to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
20 4SR. 163-72 (Affidavit of D.M Thornllill). 
21 Id. 
22 4SR. 379-86 (Affidavit of Lyle D. Eliasen). 
23 4SR. 336-41 (Exhibit U to Affidavit of Tom Henesh) 
F. Sellers assip interest k Promissory Note and Mortgage to Respoaademt 
Indian Springs, kkC 
On September 27, 2005, the Sellers executed an Assignment of Promissory Note and 
Mortgage, assigning their interest UI the aforementioiled Promissory Note and Mortgage to 
Indian Springs, L L C . ~ ~  The Assignment was recorded on October 14,2005.~' 
111. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On October 21, 2005, Indian Springs, LLC, file a Complaint to Foreclose Real Estate 
~ o r t ~ a g e . ~ ~  On December 5, 2005, au Answer was filed on behalf of AICO Recreational 
Properties, LLC; Recreatior~al Properties A&B, a partnership; Teny W. Andersen and Rosanna 
Andersen; Terry W. Andersen, Trustee of the Andersen Living Trust; and Teny W. Andersen 
and Rosama Andersen Trustees of the Terry W. Andersen and Rosanna Andersen Living 
Revocable Trust (hereinafter collectively "Andersen ~ntities*').~' On June 12, 2006, Indian 
Springs filed its First Amended 
On October 20, 2006, Indian Springs filed its Motion for Summary Judgment supported 
by the Affidavit of Torn Henesh, the Affidavit of D.M. Thonlhill, and the Affidavit of Lane 
24 4SR. 342-43 (Exhibit X to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
2' id. 
26 R 1. The Complaint was filed against numerous padies including the present Appellants. 
27 R. 139. The district court subsequently entered a Default Judpment, Decree of Foreclosure and 
Order of Sale against all other defendants based upon their failure to answer. R. 147. 
28 R. 156,159. 
 rickso on.'^ Ln the motion, Indian Springs argued that all of the Andersen Entities, with the 
exception of Recreational Properties A&B, had admitted that they did not claim an interest in the 
Real Property andior had failed to respond to requests for admission and were therefore deemed 
to have admitted thal they did not clai~n an interest in the Real As a result, the only 
question was whether Recreational Properties A&B~' owned the Real Property. Indian Springs 
argued that Recreational Properties A&B had no interest in the Real Indian Springs 
also presented evidence as to the ainount due and owing under the defaulted Promissory Note 
and Mortgage. 33 
On December 6,2006, only two of the Andersen Entities, namely Recreational Properties 
A&B and the Terry W. Andersen and Rosanna Andersen Living Revocable Trust (hereinafter 
collectively "A&B and the Trust"), filed a Response and Objeciion to the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment supported by the Affidavit of Terry ~ndersen. '~  In their Response and 
Objection, A&% and the Trust "admitted that there is an amount due and owing."35 However, 
they argued without any authority "that before any amount can be assessed, the transfening party 
29 R. 292; 4SR. 1-3 (Motion for Sumnary Judgment); 4SR. 4-31 (Me~norandum in Support); 
4SR. 32-162 (Affidavit of Lane Erickson); 4SR. 163-221 (Affidavit of D.M. Thornhill); 4SR. 
222-348 (Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
30 R. 297-99; 4SR 4-3 1 (Memorandum in Support). 
31 The terns "A&B" and "Recreational Properties A & B  when used throughout this brief shall 
refer to Recreational Properties A&B, apa~hzershiy. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 R. 292-93; 3SR. 1-16 (Response and Objection). The Affidavit of Teny Aldersen filed with 
the Response and Objection is not included in the record on appeal. 
'* 3SR. 7 (Response and Objection). 
must transfer that real property by Warranty Deed to the proper party - Recreational Properties 
A&B, a partnership.'"6 A&B and the Trust contended that the Sales Agreement and Promissory 
Note required such a tran~fer.~' They also disputed the amount due and owing under the 
Promissory Note and ~ortgage." 
On December 7, 2006, Indian Springs filed a Reply Memorandum in Suppoa of its 
Motion for S m q  Judgment and the Second Affidavit of Tom Henesh and the Affidavit of 
Lyle D. Eliasen." In its memorandum, Indian Springs generally reiterated its prior arguments 
and responded again to the issue of the amount due and owing.40 
On December 14, 2006, a hearing was held on Indian Springs' Motion for Surnmary 
~udgrnent.~' During the hearing, "it was stipulated that all the parties were in agreement as to 
every issue except  damage^."^' The district court requested that Indian Springs submit a 
proposed order based upon the stipulation.43 Indian Springs submitted a proposed order granting 
partial smmxary judgment against all of the Andersen Entities and foreclosing all right, title, and 
interest the Andersen Entities claimed to have in the property.44 
36 3SR. 1-16 (Response and Objection). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 R. 292-93; 4SR. 349-63 (Reply Memorandum); 4SR. 361-78 (Second Affidavit of Tom 
Henesh); 4SR. 379-402 (Affidavit of Lyle D. Eliasen). 
40 R. 300-304; 4SR. 349-63 (Reply Memorandum). 
41 R. at 286,292,304. 
42 R. at 304. 
On January 17, 2007, A&B and the TIUS? filed a Second Response to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Sunmary Judgment, supported by the Second Affidavit of Terry A~dersen.~' In their Second 
Response, A&B and the Trust admitted that they did "not dispute that a Warranty Deed in 
questioll was asnever issued to Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership."46 However, they 
continued to argue that the Real Property was not deeded as allegedly required by the Sales 
Agreement and Promissory Note to Recreational Properties A&B and that "[ujntil that is done 
Plaintiff and Plaintiffs assignee have failed to comply with the duties under the Sales Agreement 
and carnot seek summary They also disputed the amount due and owing under the 
Promisso~y Note and 
On January 24, 2007, A&B and the Trust filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Partial Judgment and Order, objecting o~lly to the fact that it sought to impose a partial judgment 
against Recreational Properties A & B . ~ ~  AS noted by the district court, the Andersen Entities 
were esselttially arguing that the proposed order incorrectly proposed that the redemption rights 
of Recreational Properties A&B be cut off." 
45 3SR. 16-3 1 (Second Response to Motion for Sunnnary Jud,gnent); 3SR. 32-47 (Affidavit of 
Teny W. Andersen (January 16,2007)). 
46 3SR. 23 (Second Response to Motion for Sunmary Judgment)(emphasis in original). 
" 3SR. 24 (Second Response to Motion for S u a r y  Judgment). 
48 3SR 24-30 (Second Response to Motio~l for Sunnnary Judgment). 
49 R. 304; 3SR. 48-51 (Opposition to Plaintiffs Proposed Partial Judgment and Order). 
Id. 
On January 29, 2007, Indian Springs filed a Secoild Reply Memorandum, which 
gei~eraly responded to each of the ar-gments made by A&B and the Trust and clarifying the 
amount due and owing under the Promissory Note and Mortgage." 
On June 28, 2007, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision aid Order, 
granting sunmary judgment in favor of Indian   rings.^' The district court concluded that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact remaining with regard to the fact that Recreational 
Properties A&B did not have any interest in the Real Property. The district court found that no 
deed or mortgage had ever been executed transferring any interest in the Real Property to 
Recreational Properties A&B. The district court also rejected the claim made by A&B and the 
Trust that the parties allegedly intended that the Real Property to be transferred to Recreational 
Properties A&B because the evidence indisputably showed that, after being deeded the Real 
Property on July 2, 1996, Terry Audersen as Trustee and the Bakers choose to transfer the Real 
Property to AICO and not to Recreational Properties A&B. The district court found that the 
inescapable conclusion from the evidence was that the A&B and !he Trust knew that 
Recreational Properties A&B did not have any ownership in the Real Property. The district courl 
also found that tliere was no genuine issue of inaterial fact remaining with regard to the existing 
default under the Promissory Note and Mortgage and no genuine issue of material fact remaining 
with regard to the amount due and o w i ~ ~ g  thereunder. 
j' R. 292-93,305; 4SR 4031119 (Second Reply Metnorandurn). 
j' R. 291-316. 
On July 26, 2007, "Terry and Rosanna Andersen, Pro sex filed a document entitled 
Motion for Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New  rial.^ Ln the motion, the 
Andersens requested (1) that the district court reconsider its grant of summary judgment; (2) that 
at least nine other parties, including a bankruptcy trustee and an attorney, be joined; and (3) that 
the Andersens be permitted to add a counterclaim for damages against Indian Springs and the 
Thornhills. No affidavit was filed in support of this motion. hstead, the Andersens simply 
attached what appeared to be 176 pages of documents to the motion as so-called   exhibit^."'^ 
Indian Springs objected to the admissibility of these  document^.^' 
On August 9, 2007, the attorney for tlle Andersen Entities was granted leave to 
viithdraw.j6 
On September 19, 2007, the district court denied the Andersen's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial ul its entirety.j7 The district 
court denied the motion for reconsideration for the following reasons: (1) the Andersens' 
attempt to introduce "new evidence by way of testimony and exhibits'' was untimely under 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) m d  I.R.C.P. 60(b); (2) the testimony and exhibits subnlitted by the Andersens was 
not relevant to the district court's previous decision granting sununary judgment to Indian 
Springs; (3) even if relevant, the testimony and exhibits were in the Andersens' possession 
53 R. 323. Note that this was the first docun~ent filed pro se by the Andersen Entities. All 
previous court proceedings were conducted through counsel. 
I SR. 46-224. 
'j 2SR. 8 (Minute Entry and Order). 
j6 R. 318. 
j7 R. 322-2s. 
before the summary judgment and the Andersens for strategic or other reasons failed to introduce 
it before entxy of the summary judgment decision; (4) there was no basis under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to 
justify granting relief to the Andersens.j8 The district court also denied the Andersens' motion to 
join other parties and to add a counterclaim on the basis that it was meritless, irrelevant, and 
untimely.59 With regard to Indian Springs' objection concerning the admissibility of the 
documents attached to the motion, the district court ruled that the documents were not admissible 
into evidence but nevertheless allowed them to be included in the record below "for the sole 
purpose of allowing review on appeal of the Court's deci~ion."~~ 
On September 20, 2007, "Terry Andersen and Rosama Andersen" filed a document 
entitled .'Motion lo Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties," which sought dismissal of the 
The motion asserted the same arguments previously set forth in the Andersens' Motion for 
Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New m rial.^' 
On September 20, 2007, a Notice of Appeal was filed on behalf of "Terry W. Andersen 
and Rosanna Andersen, individually, and as members of Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, and 
as remaining partners in Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership, PRO SE..'~~ None of the 
other Andersen Entities have appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The 
j8 id. 
j9  R. 324-35. 
2SR. 8 (Minute Entry and Order). 
1SR. 225-34. 
62 Id. 
63 R. 326. Note that Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, was at any time a party to this case 
and for that reason alone is an improper appellant on appeal. 
Notice of Appeal provided that the appeal was taken "from the Memorandum and Decision, 
dated 27 July 2007, and from the Oral Judgment denying Plaintiffs' [sic] Motion for 
Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New  rial."^^ 
On November 9, 2007, a hearing was held on the Andersens' Motioil to Dismiss Non- 
Defaulting Parties, during which the district court denied the motion.65 The record does not 
contain a transcript of this hearing or a written order of the district court denying the motion. 
On November 19,2007, the district court entered a Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and 
Order of Sale, ~ k i c l ~  awarded a money judgment in tile anlount of $424,905.54 against the 
Andersen Entities, declaring Indian Springs' mortgage to be superior to all other liens, and 
allowing Indian Springs to foreclose its mortgage through the sale of the Real 
On November 30,2007, "Rosanna Andersen Pro se" filed a document entitled Motion for 
Title Clarification, Rescission of Deeds, and Dismissal of Tnis n~otion again requested 
that the district court reconsider the findings underlying its grant of summary judgment and 
dismiss the case.68 
On Decenlber 17, 2007, a Notice of Amended Appeal was filed on behalf of "Terry W. 
Andersen and Rosanna Andersen, husband and wife, and as Trustees of the Terry W. Andersen 
and Rosanna Andersen Living Revocable Trust . . . and Terry Andersen, General Partner of 
64 R. 327. 
65 See 1 SR. 243-44. 
h6 R. 341-349. 
67 2SR. 11-20. 
Id. 
Recreational Properties A&B, and Terry Andersen, Trustee of the Andersen Living   rust."^^ 
The Notice of Amended Appeal provided that the appeal was taken "from the Decision and 
Order dated September 19, 2007, Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Joining of 
Indispensable Parties, and New Trial ... and the Decision and Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties . . . on the 9' day of November, 2007 . . . and against 
the Jud,sment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale, dated November 19,2007." 
On January 23, 2008, the district court denied the Motion for Title Clarification, 
Rescission of Deeds, and Dismissal of Case" filed by "Rosanna Andersen Pro se" based upon 
oral =,went presented by the Andersens on the basis that "the motion sought to revisit the prior 
rulings of the Court in a matter that was not appropriate under I.A.R. 13@)."70 
69 This Notice of Amended Appeal does not appear to be ul the record on appeal. 
'O 2SR. at 5-9. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Appellants failed to list in their brief the issues presented on appeal. Although 
inartfnlly drafted, the Appellants' Brief appem to raise the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the district court properly granted Indian Springs' Motion for Sununary 
Judgment and accordingly entered Judopent? 
2. Whether the district court properly denied the Andersens' Motion for 
Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial? 
3. Whether the district court's properly denied the Andersens' Motion to Dismiss 
Non-Defaulting Parties? 
4. Whether the district court properly denied the Andersens' Motion for Title 
Clarification, Rescission of Deeds and Dismissal of Case? 
In addition to the issues raised in the Appellants' Brief, the Respondent Indian Springs lists the 
following additional issues presented on appeal: 
1. Whether this appeal nlust be dismissed as to Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, 
Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership, the Terry W. Andersen and Rosama 
Andersen Living Revocable Trust, and the Andersen Living Trust because it is 
unlawful for the Andersens' to represent artificial entities in a pro se capacity? 
2. Whether the Andersens in their individual capacities are precluded from 
prevailing on appeal with regard to ownership of the Real Property at issue in this 
case given that they have not challenged on appeal the district court's 
determination that they do not have any interest in the Real Property? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Indian Springs is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. 
5 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). In light of the undisputed and uuconh-overted evidence relied 
upon by the district court in granting summary judgment, the Appellants' utter failure to create a 
genuine issue of material fact either below or on appeal, the Appellants' failure to include 
sufficient portions of the record to support their appeal, and the AppelIants' failure to challenge 
all alternative grounds relied upon the district court for its decisions, the Appellants' pursuit of 
this appeal must be deemed unreasonable, f?ivolous, and uilthout merit. Therefore, Indian 
Springs respectfully requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121 and 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
STANIdAR6) OF REVIEW 
I. REVIEW OF GRANT OF S U M W Y  JUDGMENT 
When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary jud-ment, the Idaho 
Supreme Court uses the sane standard ernployed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. 
Caferty v DOT, Dep't of Molor Vehicle Seiv., 144 Idaho 324, 327, 160 P.3d 763, 766 (2007); 
Kolln ir  Saint Luke's Reg1 Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327,940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997). "[Tjf the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law," sunmary judgment is proper under I.R.C.P. 56(c). Caferty, 144 
Idaho at 327, 160 P.3d at 766. The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of genuine 
issues of material fact. Id.; Evaizs 12. GGmioZd, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997). If 
the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, 
over which this Court exercises &ee review. Fenwick v. Idu.Jzo Dep 't of Lands, 144 Idaho 3 18, 
321, 160 P.3d 757,760 (2007). 
11. REVIEW OF DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The decision to deny a request for recollsideration generally rests in the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 166, 158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007); Carnell v. 
Barker Mgt., iizc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 651, 658 (2002). Therefore, the denial of a 
request for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
U1. REMEW OF DENllAL BP MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ADD 
COUNTERCLAIM 
The denial of a motion to amend an answer to add a counterclaim is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Atwood 1:. Smith, 143 Idaho 11 0, 11 5, 138 P.3d 3 10,3 15 (2006); Adaiaroun v. 
Wyreless Sj~s., Inc., 141 Idaho 604,612, 114 P. 3d 974,982 (2005). 
IV. REVIEW OF DENIAL OF MOTION TO JOLN EVDISPENSABLE PARTIES 
Joinder of indispensable parties is governed by I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), which provides that a 
party shall be joined if: 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that 
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
the claimed interest. 
"[Jloinder of all parties with an interest in the subject matter of the suit is not required; rather, 
onIy those who have an interest in the object of the suit should be joined." Tower Asset Sub Inc. 
v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,713-14, 152 P.3 581,584-85 (2007) 
The Andersens are currently representing thelnselves without the assistance of counsel. 
Notwithstanding, this Supreme Court adheres to the rule that persons acting pro se are held to the 
same standards and rules as those represented by attorneys. Suins 17. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 
I. TEES APPEAL B.IUST BE DISMISSED AS TO ALL BUSINESS ENTITIES AND 
TRUSTS BECAUSE THE LAW DOES NOT ALLOW THE ANDERSENS TO 
REPmSENT TI-HOSE ENTlTTES IN A PRO SE CAPACITY 
In a pro se capacity, Terry and Rosanna Andersen filed a Notice of Appeal and later a 
Notice of Anlended Appeal on behalf of themselves individually, Recreational Properties A&B, 
LLC, Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership, the Terry W. Andersen and Rosama 
Andersen Living Revocable Trust, and the Andersen Living Trust. The law does not allow the 
Anderse~ls in a pro se capacity to represent business entities or trusts in a court of law. Doing so 
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. Therefore, this appeal must be dismissed as to 
Recreational Properlies A&B, LLC, Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership, the Terry W. 
Andersen and Rosanna Andersen Living Revocable Trust, and the Andersen Living Trust. 
Idaho case law does not appear to directly address this legal principle. However, it is 
well established in both federal law and the law of other state jurisdictions. 
Federal courts have uniformly held that individual persons may not appear in a pro se 
capacity in courf on behalf of "artigcial entities" including but not limited to "corporatio~~s, 
partnerships, or associations . . . otherwise than through a licensed attorney." Rowlan,d v. 
Califosrzia Meiz's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993); see also, e.g., Liclzl 17. American West 
Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058 (9'" Cir. 1994); Eagle Associates v Bank qf Monneal, 926 F.2d 1305, 
1308-09 (2nd Cir. 1991). State courts have followed suit. See, e.g., 44arlinez v. Roscoe, 33 P.3d 
887, 888-90 W.M. Ct. App. 2001); Sunde 1). Conre1 ofCal{firnia, 915 P.2d 298 (Ne-$7. 1996); 
United Accounts, Inc. 1,. Teladvantage, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 605, 606-07 (N.D. 1994); Exyr.esmjay 
Associates II I>. Friendly Ice Cream Corporation, 642 A.2d 62, 63-67 (Corn. App. Ct. 1994). 
The rationale behind this linlitation on representation has been articulated as follows: 
[The reasons] are principally that the conduct of litigation by a non-lawyer creates 
unusual burdens not only for the party he represents but as well for his adversaries 
and the court. The lay litigant frequently brings pleadings that are awkwardly 
drafted, motions that are inarticulatedly presented, proceedings that are needlessly 
multiplicative. In addition to lacking the professional skills of a lawyer, the lay 
litigant lacks many of the attorney's ethical responsibilities, e.g., to avoid 
litigating unfounded or vexatious claims. 
Eagle Associates, 926 F.2d at 1308 (citation omitted). In addition, "when one partner appears on 
behalf of the partnership, he is representing more than just himself." Id. at 1309-1310. For 
example, he is "representing other partners, general and limited, but his interests may be 
incongruous with those partners." Id. at 1310. "Requiring attorney representation also protects 
the public by helping to ensure that its interests are competently litigated." Su~zde, 915 P.2d at 
Tbis same limitation on representation has also been applied with regard to trusts. See, 
e.g., Harnblen 71. Hamblen Fanzilji firelrocable Trusf, 360 B.R 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); 
Leonesio v. U17.ited States, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1238 (D. Utah, January 13, 1999); Boutet v. 
Miller, 2001 Me. Super. LEXIS 34 (Sup. Ct. of Me., March 8, 2001); Ziegler 11. Nickel, 64 CaI. 
App. 4th 545, 547-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Back Acres Pure Trust v. Falznla~zder, 443 N.W.2d 
604, 605 (Neb. 1989). "Only a licensed attorney may represent an artificial entity such as a 
corporation, partnership, association or trust in federal court.'' Hanzblen, 360 B.R at 364. "A 
busr is an artificial entity created by law, whether common or statutory, and as such cannot 
appear in c o w  pro se as a natural person." Leonesio, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1238, "11. "A 
trustee's duties in connection with his or her office do not include the right to present argument 
pro se in courts of the state, because in this capacity such trustee would be representing interests 
of others and would therefore be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law." Back A c ~ e s  P u ~ e  
Dust, 443 N.W.2d at 605. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is requested that this Supreme Court formally adopt this 
legal principle prohibiting a pro se litigant from representing in a legal capacity any artificial 
entity such as a corporation, linzuted liability company, partnership, association, or trust. In the 
instant case, the Andersens have attempted to file an appeal on behalf of a partnership, a limited 
liability company, and two different trusts. The law does not allow them to represent these 
artificial entities in a pro se capacity. Therefore, this appeal must be disnussed with regard to 
those artificial entities, llamely Recreational Properties A&B; LLC, Recreational Properties 
A&B, a partnership, the Terry W. Andersen and Rosanna Andersen Living Revocable Trust, and 
the Andersen Living Trust - thereby leaving the Andersens in their individual capacities as the 
sole appellants in this case. 
11. THE N E R S E N S  EN TBEIR IPJD1VIDUA.L CAPACITIES CANPdOT PREVML 
ON APPEAL WITH REGARn) TO OWNERSI-PLIP OF TIiE REAL PROPERTY 
BECAUSE TREY HAVE NOT C W L E N G E D  TEE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DETEWINATION THAT TREY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST IN TKE 
REAL PROPERTY 
As argued above, the Andersens in their individual capacities are the only viable 
appellants in this case. On appeal, the Andersens challenge the district court's determination 
regarding ownership of the Real Property foreclosed upon in this case. For example, they have 
argued on appeal that the district court should have found Recreational Propeflies A&B, a 
partnership, to have an ownership interest in the Real Property. However, as argued above, these 
arguments should be rejected because the Andersens are not permitted to represent artificial 
entities in a pro se capacity. Moreover, the Audersens have not challenged the district court's 
finding that they in their individual capacities do not have any interest in the Real Property. As a 
result, it is respectfully requested that this Supreme Court a f h  for this reason the district 
court's detemklation that Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership, does not have any 
ownership interest and is not entitled to any ownership interest in the Real Property. 
111. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In the event that the Andersens are allowed to represent artificial entities on appeal, the 
district court's grant of sumnary judgment should nevertheless be affimled. Tile Andersens 
challenge the district court's grant of sunn~ary judgment on two separate grounds. They contend 
that there are genuine issues of material fact remaining (1) with regard to whether or not 
Recreational Properties A&B, a partllership, has an ownership interest in the Real Property and 
(2) with regard to the amount owing under the promissory note. These contentions are without 
merit. 
A. No genuine issue of material fact remains with regard to whetber 
Recreational Properties A&B, partnership, has an ownership interest in the 
Weal Propem 
In its Memorandun1 Decision and Order granting s m a r y  judgment, the district court 
found that Recreational Properties A&B was "precluded from claiming an interest" in tile Real 
~ ro~e r ty . "  The Judgment Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale entered by the district court 
echoed this finding in providing that Indian Springs was granted immediate possession of the 
Real Property "free and clear from any and all claims of the above named Defendants" which 
included the clainl to ownership made by Recreational Properties A&B." 
The district court concluded that Recreational Properties A&B did not have any interest 
in tile Real Property because no deed or mortgage had ever been executed transferring any 
interest in the Real Property to Recreational Properties A&B. Notably, the Appellants admitted 
this fact in their Second Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Sum~nary ~udgnlen t .~~  Moreover, the 
district court's conclusion is fuily supported by the undisputed evidence in the record considered 
on sumnary judgment and included in the record on appeal. 
The district court also rejected the Appellants' claim that the parties allegedly intended 
that the Real Property be transferred to Recreatiollal Properties A&B on the basis that it was 
" R. 311. 
72 R. 343. 
73 3SR. 2 (Appellants do "not dispute that a Warranty Deed in question was never issued to 
Recreational Properties A&B." (empl~asis in original)). 
unsupported by the evidence presented for purposes of sununary judgment. The evidence 
showed thal on July 2, 1996, the Sellers of the Real Property transferred ownership at the time of 
closing by warranty deed to "TERRY W. ANDERSEN, Trustee of Andersen Living Tmst and 
JOHN K. BAKER and JULIE BAKER, husband and wife."74 The evidence fixther showed that, 
"John K. Baker and Julie A. Baker" and "Terry W. Andersen, Tmstee" subsequently transferred 
their interests in the Real Property by warranty deeds to AICO on September 18, 1997, and 
February 24, 1998,  respective^^.^' 
Based upon this undisputed evidence, the district court pointed out that, after being 
deeded the Real Property on July 2, 1996, Terry Andersen as Trustee at~d the Bakers chose to 
transfer the Real Property to AICO and not to Recreational Properties A&B. The district court 
detennhed that the inescapable conclusion from the evidence was that the Appellants knew that 
Recreational Properties A&B did not have any ownership in the Real Property. There simply is 
no evidence presented to the district court for sumnary judgment and contained in the record on 
appeal contradicting this conclusion by the district court. 
On pages 22 to 25 of the Appellants' Brief, the Appellants present numerous so-called 
facts in conjunction with their "ownership" argument which are simply bare assertions without 
any support in the record on appeal. For example, there is no evidentiary support in the record 
for tlle Appellants' assertion that they did not receive copies of the deeds before 2000 and did not 
l4 4SR. 242-46 (Exhibits B & C to Affidavit of Tom Henesh). 
l5 4SR. 255-62 (Exhibits F & G to Affidavit of To111 Henesh). 
have an opportunity to .'correct2' them.76 Additionally, there is no evidentiary support in tile 
record for the Appellants' assertion that the deed executed by the Bakers on Septe~nber 18, 1997, 
was a so-called '.executor deed" subject to some unidentified escrow agreement.77 
In summary, there is no evidence in the record creating a genuine issue of material fact 
with regard to the fact that Recreational Properties A&B did not have any ownership interest in 
the Real Property. The burden is on the nloving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of 
material fact Evans. 129 Idaho at 905, 935 P.2d at 168. The Appellants failed to satisfy that 
burden before the district court and before this Supreme Court. It is therefore respectiklly 
requested that the district court's grant of summary judgment be a f i k ~ e d . ~ '  
B. No genpaime issue of material fact remahs with regard to the amoulat owing 
In its Memorandm Decision and Order granting s u n a r y  judgment, the district court 
found that there were no genuine issues of material fact with regard to the anourit owing on the 
76 See Appellants' Brief at pp. 15,22 & 25. 
77 See Appellants' Brief at p. 24. 
78 It is not entirely clear from the Appellants' Brief, but it appears that Appellants may also be 
arguing that the July 2, 1997, warranty deeds effectively transferred the Real Property to A&B 
Recreational Properties, a partnership, a11d that the subsequent deeds executed by the Bakers and 
Andersen as Trustee on September 18, 1997, and February 24, 1998, respectively were somebo~v 
ineffective in later transfening this alleged partnership property to AICO. See Appellaxts' Brief 
at 24-25. If that ar-went is being made, it is frivolous and without merit. Idaho Code $53-3- 
302(a)(3) provides that partnership property "held in the name of one or more persons other than 
the partnership, without an indication in the instrument . . . of their capacity as  partners . . . nlay be 
transferred by an instrument of tmisfer executed by the persons in whose name the property is 
held." A review of the relevant deeds in this case reveals that this is exactly what occurred in 
tlGs case. Therefore, even if the Real Property was considered partnership property, it was duly 
and lawfully transferred to AICO by the aforementioned deeds. 
Promissory Note and Mortgage, and entered Judgment accordingly.79 On appeal, the Appellants 
do challenge the district court's conclusion that the Promissory Note and Mortgage were in 
default or the manner in which the amount due was calculated, with only one minor exception. 
The only argument made by the Appellants on appeal with regard to this issue is that Indian 
Springs was judicially estopped from arguing that the principal amount owing was more than 
$1 70,000 based upon an objection allegedly filed in a bankruptcy proceeding.So 
According to Defendants' Second Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, a copy of 
the alleged bankruptcy objection was allegedly attached to the Affidavit of Teny Andersen filed 
with the Appellants' initial Response and Objection to Indian Springs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. However, that affidavit is not part of the record on appeal. In the absence of any 
admissible evidence concerning the objectioqs' the Appellants' argument must fail on the basis 
that Appellants have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact precluding the entry of 
smnary  judgment with regard to the amount owing. 
Moreover, even if the alleged objection had been part of the record on appeal, the 
Appellants have nevertheless failed to satisfy the requirements necessary for the application of 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel. This Supreme Court has described those requirements as 
follows: 
79 R. 312-16. 
See Appellants' Brief at p. 22; see also 3SR. 12-14,27-28 (Second Response to Motion for 
Smnary  Judgment). 
It should be noted that the document contained in the appellate record as 1 SR. 100-1 01 was 
not admitted by the district court into evidence because it was not proffered by affidavit or 
testimony. See footnotes 54,55, and 60, above, and the corresponding discussion in brief. 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such sworn statenlents, 
obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, he will not 
thereafter, by repudiating such allegations and by meaus of inconsistent and 
contrary allegations or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right 
against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Loomis v Church, 76 Idaho 87,93-94,277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954); see also Heirzze v Bauer, 178 
P.3d 597, 605 (2008)(&rming Loomzs). There is no evidence that Indian Springs or its assignor 
ever obtained "a judgment, advantage or consideration" with regard to the alleged objection. 
Nor do the AppelIants argue that such was ever obtained. In the absence of any such argument 
or evidence, the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel cannot be applied. 
Lastly, it must be pointed out that on page 15 of its Memorandum Decision and Order 
granting summary judgment, the district court acknowledged the Appellants' judicial estoppel 
argument. Although not directly addressed in Uie Memorandum Decision aid Order, it is 
apparent from the district court's conclusion that it rejected the judicial estoppel arDOument. 
Rejection of the judicial estoppeI ar,wient was appropriate as a rnatter of law due to the 
Appellants failure to introduce any evidence, as mentioned above, that Indian Springs or its 
assignor ever obtained "a judgmei~t, advantage or consideration" with regard to the alleged 
objection. This Supreme Court exercises free review over issues of law. Fenwick, 144 Idaho at 
321, 160 P.3d at 760. For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully requested that the district 
court's grant of s m a r y  jud-gnent be affirmed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPEREU DENIED THE ANDERSENS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION,  JOINING OF INDISPENSlBLE PARTIES,  AND 
NEW TRIAL 
A. The District Court properly denied the Amderseaas' motion tor 
reconsideration with regard to their so-called '$tender offer" a v m e a t  
In the Motion for Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial, the 
Andersens argued that they made a -'tender offer" in compliance with LC. $ 28-3-603(2) and that 
the district court should have accordingly reconsidered its decision with regard to the amounf 
owing under the Promissory Note and ~or tgage . ' ~  It should be noted that this is the only 
argument made in the Appellants' Brief with regard to the district court's denial of the 
Andersens' request for reconsideration as coiztained in tlieir Motion for Reconsideration, Joining 
of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial. The district court denied the Andersens' motion for 
reconsideration, inciudig the "tender offer" argument, on numerous alternative grounds. The 
district court's denial of the motion should be affmed on appeal for a number of reasons. 
First, the Andersens did not have standing to file a motion for recol~sideratio~~ concerning 
the district court's grant of sunmary judgment. Indian Springs originally filed their Complaint 
for Foreclosure against numerous defendants including Terry and Rosanna Andersen ill their 
individual capacities.83 Indians Springs subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
seeking to eliminate any interest in the Real Property claimed by Terry and Rosanna Andersen in 
their individual capacities. Notably, Terry and Rosmla Andersen in their individual capacities 
82 SR. 35-36 
83 R. 1. 
opted not to respond or object to the Motion for Sumary  Judgment. In its Memorandun 
Decision and Order granting s m  judgment, the district court concluded that Terry and 
R o s m a  Andersen in their individual capacities had tbrough their discovery responses admitted 
that they did not have an interest in the Real Property. Notwithstanding their failure to oppose 
Lndian Springs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the district court's conclusion that they had 
no interest in the Real Property, the Andersens nevertheless Elled a motion for reconsideration in 
their individual capacities.s4 However, because they failed to oppose the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and because they do not challenge on appeal tl?e district court's co~iclusion that they 
do not have any interest in the Real Property, the Andersens in their individual capacities did not 
have standing to seek reconsideration of the district court's grant of summary judgment and 
thereby effectively waived any right to challenge the district court's grant of sunmary judgment 
on appeal. The district court's denial of the Andersens' motion for reconsideration should 
therefore be affm~ed. 
Second, the district court denied the motion for reconsideration because the  notion 
sought to "untimely" present previously available "new evidence" in violation of both I.R.C.P. 
56(c) and I.R.C.P. 60(b)." The Andersens failed to challenge on appeal the district court's 
decision to deny the motion on this alterative ground of untimely presentation of previously 
available evidence. Because the Andersens failed to challenge this alternative ground for the 
84 Note that tile motion for reconsideration was filed only on behalf of the Andersens 111 their 
individual capacities. It was not filed on behalf of any of the other Andersen Entities. 
'j R. 323-324. 
denial of their motion for reconsideration, the denial must be affirmed. Andemen 17. Proyl 
Escmw Sen~jces, 141 Idaho 743,746, 1 18 P.3d 75,78 (2005).'~ 
Third, the district court denied the Andersells' motion for reconsideration on the 
alternative ground that the new evidence was "not relevant to the Court's previous decision 
granting summary judgment."87 The district court specifically noted that this decision regard'mg 
relevance was based upon "the oral armwent made by Defendants and that set forth in their 
~emorandum."'' The Appellants failed to include a copy of the transcript setting forth the ord 
arbwent upon which the district court relied in making this decision regarding relevance. "The 
appellalt has the obligation to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on 
appeal." W. Cmty Ins. Co v Kicke~s, Inc , 137 Idaho 305,306,48 P.3d 634,635 (2002). In the 
absence of the oral argment transcript, this Supreme Court cannot presume error below. See id. 
Therefore, the district court's denial of the motion for reconsideration should be a f t i i ed .  
Fourth, the district court properly denied the Andersens' motion for reconsideratio11 with 
regard to the so-called tender offer defense because the Andersens failed to properly plead this 
defense and because they did not assert it ~1nti1 after the entry of smnary  judgment. The 
Andersens filed their so-called tender offer entitled "Notice of: Offer to Purchase Note & 
Mortgage" on December 6, 2006, in conjunction with the filing of their Grst objection to Indian 
Springs' Motion for Swnrnary Judgment. Nevertheless, the Andersens never made any argument 
86 It is noteworthy that this cited appellate case also involved the Andersens acting pro se and the 
Real Property at issue in the instant case. 
'' R. 324. 
" Id. 
concerning I.C. 5 28-3-603(2) before summary judgment was granted in this case. It wasn't untiI 
the Andersens filed their Motion for Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New 
Trial, that the statute was first mentioned. Because the Andersens seek to avoid payment, their 
so-called tender offer defense constitutes an affirmative defense under I.R.C.P. 89(c). However, 
no such defense was ever contained in the Andersens' Answer and the Andersens never sought 
to amend their answer to include the defense. By failing to plead their so-called tender offer 
defense and waiting until after the entry of summary judgment to assert the defense, the 
Andersens waived this defense. See Hariwell COT. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79 (Ct. 
App. 1984). 
Lastly, the Andersens so-called tender offer fails as a matter of law to comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 5 28-3-603(2), which provides: "If tender of payment of an obligation to pay 
an instrument is made . . . and the tender is refused, there is discharge, to the extent of the amount 
of the tender, of the obligation of an indorser . . ." A tender of payment has been defined in Idaho 
as the "unconditional offer of a debtor to the creditor of the amount of his debt." Brinfon I). 
Haiglzf, 125 Idaho 324,328,870 P.2d 677,681 (1994) 
Tender implies the physical act of offering the money or thing to be tendered, but 
this cannot rest in inlplication alone. The law requires an actual, present, physical 
offer; it is not satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay, which, although indicative 
of present possession of the money and intention to produce it, is unaccompanied 
by any visible manifestation of intention to make the offer good. 
Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals has also held that "as a general matter a tender 111ust be 
unconditioned." Id. at 329, 870 P.2d at 682. 
The Andersens fded their so-called tender offer as the "Notice of: Offer to Purchase Note 
& Mortgage" (hereinafter "Noticeee)." Attached to this Notice was what appears to be a 
document through which the Terry W. Andersen and Rosanna Anderson Living Revocable Tiust 
granted an unknown third-party -'the exclusive right to purchase note and mortgage'' froin Indian 
Springs by use of "good funds" and in exchange, it appears, the Trust would then make payments 
on the note and mortgage to the third-party.gO This alleged agreement between the Trust and the 
third-party was contingent upon a number of different things, including: (1) a determination of 
the Court as to tile final amount due and owing; (2) a release of security on a portion of the Real 
Property known as the house property; (3) a ruling by the Court that the note and mortgage are a 
valid lien; and (4) a d i n g  by the Court that affirms the validity of the release pro~iisions of the 
Sales Agreement dated April 24, 1996,'l 
The Notice does not comply wiih LC. 5 28-3-603(2) for a nui~ber of reasons. It does not 
offer the immediate payment of money toward the amounts owing but rather suggests payment 
would occur sometime in the future. It contains numerous contingencies that were to be satisfied 
before any payments would be made which alone preclude it from being a valid tender. It does 
not offer any particular sum of money in payment to Indian Springs. In fact, there is no evidence 
that the third party ever contacted Indian Springs in an effort to enforce its rights under the 
alleged coiltract attached to the Notice. Inlplications of payment of some unknown amount at 
89 ISR. 1-5. 
Id. 
91 Id. 
some unknown time contingent upon satisfaction of numerous other events does not satisfy the 
requirements of LC. $ 28-3-603(2). The district court's denial of the motion for reconsideration 
should therefore be affirmed. 
For the foregoing alternative reasons, the district court's denid of the Andersens' motion 
for reconsideration on the issue of its tender offer defense should be affirmed. 
B. The District Court properly denied the Andersens' motion to amend tbeir 
Answer to add a slew counterclaim after the entry of summary judgment 
In the Motion for Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial, the 
Andersens appear to request leave to amend their Answer to add a counterclaim seeking 
n~onetary damages from Indian Springs and D.M. Thornhill for actions allegedly comrnirted by 
D.M. ~ h o m h i l l . ~ ~  The proposed counterclaim alleged that D.M. Thomill failed to properly 
disclose certain items at the time of the Real Property's sale in 1996 resulting in damages 
incurred by the Andersens in 1998. The proposed counterclaim also alleges rbat D.M. Thornbill 
"fraudulently claimed" certain itenls of personal property in Balkruptcy Court and committed 
acts of "fraudulent con\~ersion" which allegedly occurred between 1996 and 2003. The district 
court correctly denied the Andersens' motion to amend their Answer to add this counterclahn on 
the basis that the motion was "without merit, irrelevant, and 
First, the district court correctly denied the Andersens'motion to anend because the 
proposed counterclaim frivolously sought to hold Indian Springs liable for conduct allegedly 
committed by Thornhill. The Andersens' provide no legal basis in support of their attempt to 
bold Indian Springs liable as an assignee of a promissory note and mortgage for Thornhill's 
alleged u n l a d  actions. Indeed, there is no legal basis for such a clainl. Therefore, the 
proposed counterclaim was improper. 
Second, the disfrict court correctly denied the Andersens' motion to amend because the 
proposed counterclaim is precluded by the statute of limitations. According to the proposed 
countercIaim, Thornhill allegedly failed to disclose certain items at the time of sale which injured 
the Andersens by 1998 and fraudulently converted certain items between 1996 and 2003. The 
"failure to discIosem claim appears to be based upon either common law fraud or a violation of 
I.C. 5 55-2504. In either case, the statute of limitations is only three years for claims based upon 
fraud or upon a violation of statute. I.C. 5 5-218. As a result, the statute of l i t a t i ons  with 
regard to the "failure to disclose-' claim had expired by at least 2001 which was long before this 
case was even filed. Likewise, the conversion claim appears to be based upon fkaud and 
therefore also has a three-year statute of limitation wluch expired long before the proposed 
counterclaim was asserted. Therefore, tile proposed counterclaim was imnproper. 
Fourth, the district court correctIy denied the Andersens' motion to amend because the 
proposed counterclaim appears to be an unlawfiil attempt to collaterally attack bmkmptcy court 
proceedings. See Farmem Nat'l Bank v Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 69, 878 P.2d 762, 768 (1994) 
("releasing creditors 'Gom the bonds of res judicata would allow theun to launch collateral 
attacks on c o d i n e d  plans, undermining the necessary ability of the bankruptcy courts to settle 
all claims against the debtor"'). Therefore, the proposed counterclaim was inlproper. 
Lastly, the district c o w  correctly denied the Andersens' motion to amend on the basis 
that it was untimely filed Notably, the Andersens failed to challenge on appeal the district 
court's decision to deny the motion to amend on the alterative grounds that it was untimely. 
''When a decision is based upon altemative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in 
error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if the judgme~~t can be sustained upon one of 
the other grounds." Andemen, 141 Idaho at 746, 118 P.3d at 78. In the instant case, the 
AppeIlants' Brief attacks the district court's decision to deny the Andersens' motion to amend on 
a number of different bases. However, it faiIs to challenge the final basis on which the motion to 
amend was denied, thal being untinlelimess. Because the Andersens failed to challenge this 
alternative ground for the denial of their motion to amend, the denial must be aff i i~ed.  Id. 
For the aforenlentioned reasons, it is respectNly requested that the district court's denial 
of the Andersens' motion to amend their Answer to add a counierclain be affmed 
C. The Distr?ict Court properly denied the hderset ts '  motion to join additional 
parties 
In the Motion for Reco~lsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial, the 
Andersens requested that the district court join alleged indispensible parties, namely "Margie and 
Everett Ells, the Garland Larson family, Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, Glen Mahoney, 
Trustee R. San1 Hopkins, h4erritt Thornhills (Plaintiffs Assignor), Metro Title, and Lyle 
~ l i a s o n . " ~ ~  The district court denied this motion on the basis that it was "without merit, 
94 ISR. 36-37. 
irrelevant, and untimely."9s On appeal, the Appellants only challenge the district court's refusal 
to add Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, as an indispensable party.96 
The joinder of indispensible parties is governed by I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). "The moving party 
has t l~e burden to demonstrate the indispensability of a party." Ada Counly Higiz~~lay Disi. 1s 
Total Success Invs , LLC, 179 P.3d 323,335 (2008). 
First, the district court's denial of t l~e Andersens' motion to join indispensable parties 
should be affirmed because the Andersens presented no admissible evidence to the district court 
to demonstrate the indispensability of Recreational Properties A&B, L L C . ~ ~  AS discussed above, 
the documents presented by the Andersens in support of their motion were simply attached to 
their motion. Because they were not submitted by affida-vit, t l~e documents were not admitted 
into evidence by the district court. In the absence of any admissible evidence demonstrating the 
indispensability of Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, the district court's denial of the motion to 
add indispensable parties should be affmed. 
Second, eveli if the documents had been admitted into evidence by the district court, the 
Andersens nevertheless failed to present any viable argument or authority that Recreational 
Properties A&B, LLC, was indeed indispe~~sable. Although there may have been documents 
suggesting the corporate creation and existence of Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, there is 
no evidence whatsoever that Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, ever possessed any interest in 
95 R 324-325. 
96 See Appellants' Brief at 27. 
97 See R 38-38. 
the Real ~ r o ~ e r t y . ~ '  Therefore, there is no evidence that Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, 
was an indispensable party. 
Thirq the Andersens clajll that Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, was a partner in 
Recreational Properties A&B, a partnership, and is therefore an indispensable party is also 
without merit. Idaho Code $ 53-3-307 allows a lawsuit to be filed in the name of the partnership 
without naming any of the partners. Moreover, there is no admissible evidence indicating that 
Recreational Properties A&B, LLC, was ever a partner in Recreational Properties A&B, a 
partnership. 
Lastly, the district court correctly denied the Andersens' motion to add indispensable 
parties on the basis that it was untimely filed. Notably, the Andersens failed to challenge on 
appeal the district court's decision to deny the motion on the alterative grounds that it was 
untimely. In the instant case, the Appellant Brief attacks the district court's decision to deny the 
Andersens' motion to add indispensable parties on a number of different bases. However, it fails 
to challenge the final basis on which the motion to amend was denied, that being untimeliness. 
Because the Andersens failed to challenge this alternative ground for the denial of their motion 
to amend, the denial must be affimled. Andemen, 141 Idaho at 746, 11 8 P.3d at 78. 
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully requested that the district court's denial 
of the Andersens' motion to add indispensable parties. 
98 This statement is also true with regard to all of the parties listed as indispensable in the 
Andersens' motion. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of them ever had any interest in 
the Real Property at issue in this case. As such, they are not indispensible. 
V. TEE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF TEE ANLPERSENS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS NON-DEFAULTING PARTIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL 
The Notice of Amended Appeal states that the Appellants are also appealing the district 
court's denial of their Motion to Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties. This motion filed by "Teny 
Andersen and Rosanna Andersen" appeared to seek dismissal of the Coinplaint against them?9 
The Motion to Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties appeared to contain the same argwnents 
previously set forth in their Motion for Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and 
New  rial.'^^ 
The hearing on the Andersens' Motion to Dismiss Non-Defadting Parties was held on 
November 9,2007, at which time the district court denied the motion.lO' In light of the fact that 
the district court did not reconsider its grant of s m a r y  judgment, it is clear that the district 
court denied the Andersens' Motion to Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties. Notwithstanding, the 
Andersens have failed to include in the appellate record either the transcript of that hearing or 
auy written d i n g  of the district court. In the absence of the transcript or the written ruling, it is 
impossible to review the basis for the district court's denial of the motion. In the absence of a 
record -that is adequate to review the district court's actions, this Supreme Court cannot presume 
error below. W. Cmty. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho at 306, 48 P.3d at 635. Therefore, the district court's 
denial of the Andersens' Motion to Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties must be affirmed. 
99 1SR. 225-26. 
loo ISR. 225-34. 
lo' See 1SR. 243-44. 
Alternatively, the dismct court's denial of the Andersens' Motion to Dismiss Non- 
Defaulting Parties must be affirn~ed for the same reasons discussed above as they pertain to the 
arguments asserted in the motion and further challenged in the Appellants' Brief on appeal.lo2 
VP. TEE DISTRICT COURT'S D E W  OF THE AN?IERSENS' MOTION FOR 
TITLE CLARIFICATION, RESCISSION OF DEEDS AND DESMlSSAL OF 
CASE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL 
On page 30 of the Appellants' Brief, it appears that the Appellants are attempting to 
challenge the district court's denial of their Motion for Title Clarification, Rescission of Deeds, 
and Dismissal of Case.Io3 The motion filed by "Rosanna Andersen, Pro se" sought again to have 
the district court reconsider its grant of summary judgment in this case and to dismiss the 
Complaint. The motion set forth what appear to he the same arguments represented 111 the 
previous hilotion for Recoilsideration, Joining of ludispensible Parties, and New Trial and 
Motion to Dismiss Non-Defaulting Parties. 
The district court denied this motion at a hearing held January 23, 2 0 0 8 . ' ~ ~  The district 
court recognized that its authority to rule on certain rnaEers was liinited by I.A.R. 13@).105 As a 
result, the district court asked the Andersens at the bearing "to identify how their pending post- 
'" Any argunlents made in the motion but not challenged on appeal have thereby been waived. 
See Ryder v. Idaho PUC, 141 Idaho 918, 925, 120 P.3d 736, 743 (2005)("A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argunleni is lacking [on appeal], not just if both are 
lacking.") 
'03 2SR. 11-21 (Motion for Title Clarification, Rescission of Deeds, and Disnlissal of Case). 
lo' 2SR. 7 (Minute Entry and Order). 
10S id. 
judgment motions implicated the Court's available jurisdiction under IAR 13@)."'~~ Based upon 
the arguments made at the hearing, the Court concluded that the motion sought to revisit the 
prior d i n g s  in a matter that was not appropriate under IAR 13@).'07 Therefore, the district 
court denied the motion. 
Notwithstanding, the Andersens have failed to include the transcript of the hearing in the 
appellate record. In the absence of the transcript, it is inlpossible to review the basis for the 
distict court's denial of the motion. III the absence of a record that is adequate to review the 
district court's actions, this Supreme Court cannot presume error below. W Cinp. Ins. Co , 137 
Idaho at 306,48 P.3d at 635. Therefore, the distsict court's denial of the Andersens' Motion for 
Title Clarification, Rescission of Deeds, and Dismissal of Case must be *rmed. 
Alternatively, the district court's denial of the Andersens' Motion to Dismiss Non- 
Defaulting Parties must be affmed for the same reasons discussed above as they pertain to the 
ar,pnents asserted in the motion and further challenged in the Appellants' Brief on appeal.'0s 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfldly requested that the district court's grant 
of sumnary jud,~ent and Judgment entered in this case be affin~~ed. It is Eurrher requested that 




lo' Any arguments made in the motion but not challenged on appeal have thereby been waived. 
See Ryder, 141 Idaho at 925, 120 P.3d at 743 ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either 
authority or argument is lacking [on appeal], not just if both are lacking.") 
Reconsideration, Joining of Indispensible Parties, and New Trial; (2) Motion to Dislliss Non- 
Defaulting Parties; and (3) Motion for Title Clarification, Rescission of Deeds and Dismissal of 
Case. It is also requested that Indian Springs be granted its attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending against this appeal. 
DATED this 1 day of August, 2008. 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTEFGD 
SCOTT J. SMITH, of the firm 
Attorneys for Respondent Indian Springs, LLC. 
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